Quantum private information retrieval (QPIR) is a protocol that a user retrieves a file from non-communicating n servers by downloading quantum systems without revealing the identity of the target file. We study the t-private QPIR that the identity of the target file is kept secret even if at most t servers may collude to reveal the identity. As a result, we prove that the t-private QPIR capacity is 1 for 1 ≤ t ≤ n/2 and 2(n − t)/n for n/2 < t < n, where the QPIR capacity is the maximum rate of the file size over the size of downloaded quantum systems. We construct a capacity-achieving QPIR protocol with zero-error and perfect user secrecy against the collusion of t servers. Our protocol also achieves the server secrecy, i.e., the user obtains no other information than the target file. We also prove the optimality of our protocol with converse bounds.
I. INTRODUCTION
When a user retrieves information from databases, it is often required to protect the privacy of the user. Private information retrieval (PIR) is the problem to retrieve one of f files from non-communicating n servers without revealing to each individual server which file is downloaded. Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz, and Sudan [1] originally considered this problem for one server and one-bit files, and proved that the optimal communication complexity is O(f), i.e., downloading all files in the server is optimal. They also considered a PIR protocol with multiple servers, and along with the following works [2] - [4] , the communication complexity is significantly improved. Furthermore, on PIR with multiple servers and in the case where the file size is allowed to be arbitrarily large, Sun and Jafar [5] started to discuss the PIR capacity which is the maximum rate of the file size over the download size, and derived that the PIR capacity is (1 − 1/n)/(1 − (1/n) f ). PIR with large file size and PIR capacities have also been derived in many other settings [6] - [19] .
On the other hand, in recent years, there has been a growing interest in quantum communication as a means to overcome the limitations of existing communication technologies. Above all, there has been a great deal of interest in enhancing security and efficiency, and thus, the quantum PIR (QPIR) has also been studied [20] - [27] . Le Gall [24] showed that the communication complexity for the one-server QPIR for f one-bit files is enhanced as O( √ f). For multi-server QPIR, the paper [26] derived that the QPIR capacity is 1, and the proposed QPIR protocol achieves the capacity only with two servers. Whereas the papers [20] - [25] considered the QPIR model with quantum upload and quantum download, the papers [26] , [27] considered the QPIR model with the classical upload and quantum download but instead allowing an entangled state is shared among servers before the protocol starts.
In PIR, the user may obtain some information on the n − 1 non-target files. Therefore, it is preferable to consider the server secrecy that the user obtains no information other than the target file. The PIR with the server secrecy is called symmetric PIR, which is also called oblivious transfer [28] in one-server case. The paper [29] proved that shared randomness among servers is necessary to construct symmetric PIR protocols. Assuming the shared randomness among servers, the paper [7] derived that the symmetric PIR capacity is 1 − n −1 . In quantum case, the paper [21] proved that the symmetric QPIR can be implemented if quantum upload and quantum download are available. This result fundamentally follows from the fact that the quantum upload may generate entanglement among the user and the servers. t-Private PIR 1 − t/n 1 − (t/n) f [8] 1 for t ≤ n/2 ‡ 2(n − t) n for n/2 < t ‡ t-Private symmetric PIR n − t n [16] † * n, f: the numbers of servers and files, respectively. † Shared randomness among servers is necessary. ‡ Capacities are derived with the strong converse bounds.
Furthermore, one weakness of the multi-server PIR is the assumption of no communication among servers. To relieve this assumption, PIR has also been studied even in the case where some of the servers may collude. The t-private PIR is the PIR with stronger user secrecy, called user t-secrecy or t-privacy, that the identity of the retrieved file is unknown to any collection of t servers. The paper [8] proved that the t-private PIR capacity is
Assuming the shared randomness among servers, the paper [16] derived that the symmetric t-private PIR capacity is (n − t)/n. On the other hand, in quantum case, the paper [27] proved that the symmetric (n − 1)-private QPIR capacity is 2/n for even number n of servers, but it is unknown for 1 ≤ t < n − 1.
As an extension of the capacity results in [26] , [27] , we consider the symmetric t-private QPIR capacity for 1 ≤ t < n, where n is the number of servers. Similarly to the papers [26] and [27] , we define the QPIR model as follows: a user retrieves one of m files from n non-communicating servers each of which contain the whole classical file set; the servers share an entangled state before the protocol starts; and the user uploads classical queries, downloads quantum systems, and recover the target file by quantum measurement. The capacity is defined with four security parameters: error probability, server secrecy, user t-secrecy, and upload cost. As a main result, we prove that the symmetric t-private QPIR capacity is 1 for 1 ≤ t ≤ n/2 and 2(n − t)/n for n/2 < t < n. We also construct the capacity-achieving protocol by stabilizer formalism, and presents the converse bounds for 1 ≤ t ≤ n/2 and n/2 < t < n, respectively.
Our result implies that for 1 ≤ t ≤ n/2, the symmetric t-private QPIR capacity is 1 regardless of requiring the strongest security condition that the protocol has zero-error, perfect user t-secrecy, and perfect server secrecy, or requiring the weakest security condition that the protocol has arbitrary error less than 1, no user t-secrecy, and no server secrecy. This implies that the QPIR guarantees the user ⌊n/2⌋-secrecy without sacrificing any communication rate. Furthermore, whereas the capacity result in [26] shows that there is no advantage over to use more than two servers in PIR without collusion, our result implies that QPIR with more servers can obtain the stronger secrecy against the collusion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II formally describes the QPIR protocol, defines the QPIR capacity, and presents the main results of the paper. Section III gives the preliminaries for code construction and Section IV constructs the capacity-achieving QPIR protocol with colluding servers. Section V presents the converse bounds of the capacity result. Section VI is the conclusion of the paper.
Terms and Notations: The matrix I n denotes the n × n identity matrix, and Pr X [q(X)] is the probability that X satisfies the condition q(X). The quantum information measures used in the paper is given in Appendix A.
II. QPIR MODEL AND MAIN RESULT
In this section, we formally state the definition of QPIR protocol and present the main result of the paper.
A. Description of QPIR Protocol
In this subsection, we review the description of the QPIR protocol given in [26] , [27] .
User
Target Index: K ∈ {1, . . . , f}
Colluding Servers Fig. 1 : Quantum private information retrieval protocol, where t servers collude to know the target index K. The user does not know which t servers collude.
The files M 1 , . . . , M f ∈ {0, . . . , m−1} are uniformly and independently distributed. The n servers serv 1 , . . . , serv n contain the entire file set M = (M 1 , . . . , M f ). Let A ′ 1 , . . . , A ′ n be d ′ -dimensional Hilbert spaces. The state of the quantum system A ′ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ A ′ n is initialized as ρ prev , and is distributed such that the s-th server serv s contains A ′ s . The user chooses the file index K ∈ {1, . . . , f} uniformly and independently of M in order to retrieve the file M K . The user chooses a randomness R user from a set R user and encodes the index K to queries Q 1 , . . . , Q n , i.e.,
where Q 1 , . . . , Q n are finite sets. Then, the user sends Q s to the s-th server serv s (s = 1, . . . , n). Let A 1 , . . . , A n be d-dimensional Hilbert spaces. After receiving the query Q s , the s-th server serv s constructs a TP-CP map Λ s from A ′ s to A s by the server encoder as Enc servs (Q s , M ) = Λ s , applies Λ s on A ′ s , and sends A s to the user. Then, the state on A 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ A n after server encoding is written as
The user decodes the received state by decoder. The decoder is defined as a positive-operator valued measure (POVM) Y KQ := {Y KQ (w) | w ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1}} on A 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ A n , where the measurement outcome associated with Y KQ (w) is w. By the POVM, the user outputs the measurement outcome W as the retrieval result.
Given the numbers n, f of servers and files, the QPIR protocol is defined by the four-tuple B. Security Parameters and Capacity of t-Private QPIR Given the number t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} of colluding servers, the security parameters and the capacity are defined. 1) Security Parameters: Let W be the protocol output, M c k be the collection of all files except for M k , S n be the symmetric group of {1, . . . , n}, i.e., the set of all permutations on {1, . . . , n}, and Q π,t := (Q π(1) , . . . , Q π(t) ) for π ∈ S n . The security of a QPIR protocol is evaluated by the error probability, server secrecy, and user t-secrecy:
..,mn), k∈{1,...,f}, q∈Q1×···×Qn
= max m=(m1,...,mn), k∈{1,...,f}, q∈Q1×···×Qn
where I(·; ·|·) ρ is the quantum conditional mutual information.
Remark 1. The server secrecy is also written as QPIR ) ≤ β, the condition p kq = 0 implies p iq = 0 for any k = i ∈ {1, . . . , f}. Otherwise, we derive a contradiction as follows. If p kq , p iq = 0 for some k = i, the server secrecy S serv (Ψ (m)
However, we have the following contradiction
where (a) is derived from Lemma V.1.
2) t-Private QPIR Capacity: The t-private QPIR capacity is defined with the security and upload constraints. For any α ∈ [0, 1) and any β, γ, θ ∈ [0, ∞], the asymptotic and exact security-constrained t-private QPIR capacities are defined by
where the supremum is taken for sequences {m ℓ } ∞ ℓ=1 such that lim ℓ→∞ m ℓ = ∞ and sequences {Ψ
C. Main Result
The following theorem is the main result of the paper.
Theorem II.1. The capacity of t-private QPIR with n ≥ 2 servers and f ≥ 2 files is
for any α ∈ [0, 1) and any β, γ, θ ∈ [0, ∞], and
The capacity-achieving QPIR protocol is constructed in Section IV for n/2 ≤ t < n. The protocol obtains zeroerror (P err (Ψ Since the user (n/2)-secrecy guarantees the user t-secrecy for 1 ≤ t < n/2, the constructed protocol for t = n/2 is also the capacity-achieving protocol for 1 ≤ t < n/2. The converse bounds are given in Section V. (13) is derived for the case where any server secrecy β ∈ [0, ∞) is allowed. However, one may notice that for some parameters (n, t, f), the capacity (13) is smaller than the capacity (1 − (t/n))/(1 − (t/n) f ) [8] of classical t-private PIR without server secrecy. For instance, when (n, t, f) = (4, 3, 2), the capacity (13) is 0.5 and the capacity in [8] is 0.57. This follows from the fact that the capacity (13) is derived for finite β but the capacity in [8] is derived for the case where the β is allowed to be infinite.
Remark 3. The capacity

III. PRELIMINARIES FOR PROTOCOL CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we give preliminaries for our protocol construction in Section IV.
A. Stabilizer Formalism
Let F q be a finite field for a prime power q = p r , and A be a q-dimensional Hilbert space with a basis
where ω := exp(2π √ −1/p). Here, we define tr x := Tr T x ∈ F p for x ∈ F q , where T x ∈ F r×r p denotes the matrix representation of the map y ∈ F q → xy ∈ F q by identifying the finite field F q with the vector space F r p . For a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ), b = (b 1 , . . . , b n ) ∈ F n q , define the following unitaries on A ⊗n : X(a) := X(a 1 ) ⊗ X(a 2 ) ⊗ · · · ⊗ X(a n ),
Then, for any (a, b),
where
From (14), all elements of S(V) are commutative, and therefore, are simultaneously diagonalized. Since (W(w)) p =
Since
holds because for any v ∈ V,
=
Therefore, all eigenspaces A V [w] have the same dimension dim A ⊗n /|F 2n q /V ⊥J | = q n /q d = q n−d , and the quantum system A ⊗n is decomposed as
where W is the d-dimensional subspace with the basis
B. Lemmas for code construction
In this subsection, we prepare two lemmas for the code construction.
The following proposition is a slight generalization of the construction [31, Appendix A].
Proposition III.1. Let F p be the finite field of prime order p and F q be the algebraic extension
such that
Then, any r row vectors of the matrixĀ
are linearly independent. In particular, when k = 2r, the square matrix A ∈ F r×r q is invertible.
Proof: Before we give the proof, we introduce the following notation: 
The following lemma is fundamental to guarantee the user t-secrecy in our protocol.
Lemma III.2. Let n, m be positive integers such that n/2 ≤ m < n. For a sufficiently large prime power q, there exist 2m linearly independent vectors v 1 , . . . , v 2m ∈ F 2n q satisfying the following conditions. (a)
Let w 1 , . . . , w 2n be the row vectors of the matrix D = (v 1 , . . . , v 2m ) ∈ F 2n×2m q . Then, w π(1) , . . . , w π(m) , w π(1)+n , . . . , w π(m)+n are linearly independent for any permutation π in S n . 
(v 2n−2m+1 , . . . , v 2m ) = (s 1 , . . . , s 2m−n , s n+1 , . . . , s 2m ).
Therefore, in the following, we prove that there exists a symplectic matrix S = (s 1 , . . . , s 2n ) such that the row vectors of S ′ := (s 1 , . . . , s 2m ) satisfy condition (a).
First, we construct a symplectic matrix as follows. Let F p be the finite field of prime order p and F q be the algebraic extension F p (α 1 , . . . , α n+2m−2 ), where α i ∈ F p (α 1 , . . . , α i−1 ) for any i. For convenience, let α 0 := 1.
Define two square matrices
i.e.,
Since the matrix
is a symplectic matrix if X is symmetric, the matrix
is a symplectic matrix, where the inverse A −1 exists from Proposition III.1. With the notation
Now, we prove that the row vectors of S ′ := (s 1 , . . . , s 2m ) satisfy condition (a). Since (i) the right multiplication of invertible matrices and (ii) elementary column operations do not change the linear independence of the row vectors, we manipulate the matrix S ′ in the following way:
. By the above transformation, the linear independence of the row vectors of S ′ is equivalent to that of S ′′ . Let
by adding the row vectors (I 2m−n , 0, 0) to S ′′ . If any 2m row vectors of S ′′′ are linearly independent, then S ′′ and S ′ also satisfy the same property. Since
by applying Proposition III.1 for S ′′′ , any 2m row vectors of S ′′′ are linearly independent. Thus, the matrix S ′ also satisfies the same property as S ′′′ , which implies condition (a).
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF QPIR PROTOCOL WITH COLLUDING SERVERS
In this section, we construct the capacity-achieving QPIR protocol for n ≥ 2 servers, f ≥ 2 files, n/2 ≤ t < n colluding servers. For the collusion of 1 ≤ t < n/2 servers, the protocol for t = n/2 is the capacity-achieving protocol.
A. Construction of Protocol
Let n ≥ 2, f ≥ 2, and n/2 ≤ t < n. For the construction of the protocol, we choose a sufficiently large prime power q and a basis v 1 , . . . , v 2n of F 2n q such that the vectors v 1 , . . . , v 2t satisfy the conditions of Lemma III.2. Let
We assume that the vectors v 1 , . . . , v 2n are publicly known to the user and all servers. Each server contains the entire file set {m 1 , . . . , m f ∈ F 2(n−t) q }. We denote m i = (m i,1 , . . . , m i,2(n−t) ) for i = 1, . . . , f and m := (m 1,1 , . . . , m 1,2(n−t) , m 2,1 , . . . , m 2,2(n−t) , . . . , m f,1 , . . . , m f,2(n−t) ) ⊤ ∈ F 2(n−t)f q .
The target file index is k, i.e., the user retrieves m k .
The protocol is described as follows.
Protocol IV.1. 1) [Distribution of Entangled State] Let A 1 , . . . , A n be q-dimensional Hilbert spaces. From (21), the quantum system A := A 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ A n is decomposed as
[0]| ⊗ ρ mix , where ρ mix := (1/q 2t−n ) · I q 2t−n and is distributed such that the s-th server obtains A s for s = 1, 2, . . . , n.
2) [Query] The user randomly chooses a matrix R from F 2(n−t)f×2t q with the uniform distribution. Depending on k, define E k := (δ i,j+2(n−t)(k−1) ) i,j ∈ F 2(n−t)f×2(n−t) q , where δ x,y = 1 if x = y and δ x,y = 0 if x = y, and
The user sends the query q s :
to the s-th server for s = 1, 2, . . . , n.
3) [Download]
For each s = 1, 2, . . . , n, the s-th server applies X(q ⊤ sX m)Z(q ⊤ sZ m) to A s and sends A s to the user.
4) [Recovery] The user applies the PVM B
. The measurement outcome of the user is denoted by [w out ]. In the expansion
B. Analysis of Protocol IV.1
In this section, we analyze the performance of Protocol IV.1.
First, we show that the user obtains m k without error. Let
The state after the server encoding is
where the equality holds from Lemma III.1. Thus, the measurement outcome is
is independent of the representative of [w out ], the user obtains (c 2t+1 , c 2t+2 , . . . , c 2n ) = (m k,1 , . . . , m k,2(n−t) ) = m k without error.
The download cost is dim n s=1 A s = q n and the file size is |F 2(n−t) q | = q 2(n−t) , which implies that the QPIR rate is 2(n − t)/n.
The protocol has the perfect server secrecy because from (39), the state after server encoding is |[w ′ ] [w ′ ]|⊗ρ mix , which is independent of the non-retrieved files.
To discuss the user secrecy of Protocol IV.1, we introduce the following notations. We denote v i = (v 1,i , . . . , v 2n,i ) ⊤ ∈ F 2n q for i = 1, . . . , 2n. For any permutation π in S n , we denote
The user t-secrecy is proved as follows. Let π be an arbitrary permutation in S n . The queries to π(1)-th server, . . . , π(t)-th server are written as (q π(1)X , . . . , q π(t)X , q π(1)Z , . . . , q π(t)Z ) = RV ⊤ 1,π + E k V ⊤ 2,π ∈ F 2(n−t)f×2t q .
(43)
Since condition (a) of Lemma III.2 implies rank V 1,π = 2t, when R is uniform random in F 2(n−t)f×2t q , the distribution of (q π(1)X , . . . , q π(t)X , q π(1)Z , . . . , q π(t)Z ) is the uniform distribution on F 2(n−t)f×2t q . Therefore, the colluding servers obtain no information of the target file index K = k since the matrix R is unknown to the colluding servers and is uniform random in F 2(n−t)f×2t q .
V. CONVERSE BOUNDS
The converse bounds of Theorem II.1 are written as
The bounds (44) and (45) are proved in the similar ways as [26] and [27] , respectively. We give the details of the two proofs in Appendix C.
In the remainder of this section, we present the proof of (46). For any π ∈ S n , let Q π,t c := (Q π(t+1) , . . . , Q π(n) ), A π,t := t s=1 A π(s) , and A π,t c := n s=t+1 A π(s) . Let d t := d t and d t c := d n−t be the dimensions of A π,t and A π,t c , respectively. Let ρ M Qπ,t be the state of the t-colluding servers after the server encoding. The function h(x) is the binary entropy function h(x) := −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x).
We prepare two lemmas. The security conditions (2), (3), and (4) give the following bounds.
Lemma V.1. The error probability P err (Ψ (m)
The server secrecy S serv (Ψ (m)
The user t-secrecy S
where d(·, ·) is the variational distance d(p, q) := (1/2) · j |p j − q j | for probability distributions p, q.
The proof of Lemma V.1 is given in Appendix B. The quantities evaluated in Lemma V.1 can be considered as weak security conditions. We only use these quantities for the converse proofs. The following lemma is the fundamental lemma in the converse proof. 
In particular, when α = γ = 0, we have I(M k ; A π,t |QM c k , K = k) ρMQ π,t ≤ β for any k ∈ {1, . . . , f}. Proof: Let k = i ∈ {1, . . . , f}. We obtain the lemma as follows.
≤ I(M k ; A π,t Q π,t |M c k , K = k) ρMQ π,t (55)
The equality (a) holds because Q π,t c is independent of M k and the state ρ M Qπ,t on A π,t . The inequality (c) follows from the server secrecy and the inequality (d) is from (47) and (48). The inequality (b) is derived as follows. From (49), the user t-secrecy S 
When we defineρ M Qπ,t|k := m,qπ,t (1/m) f · p Qπ,t=qπ,t|K=k · |m, q π,t m, q π,t | ⊗ ρ mqπ,t for k ∈ {1, . . . , f}, the inequality (63) implies that
for any i = k ∈ {1, . . . , f}, where d is the trace distance d(ρ, σ) := (1/2) · Tr |ρ − σ| for quantum states ρ, σ. Thus, Fannes inequality for mutual information [30, Eq. (5.106)] implies that
which implies the inequality (b). The converse (46) is proved as follows. Assume that P err (Ψ QPIR ) ≤ γ. Fix K = k and π ∈ S n . Let ρ w,z be the quantum state on the composite system n s=1 A s , where w is the file to be retrieved, i.e., the k-th file, and z := (m c , q) for the collection m c of non-retrieved f − 1 files and the collection q of queries. Let σ z := (1/m) m−1 w=0 ρ w,z . Considering the entire system A as a bipartite system A π,t ⊗ A π,t c , let σ z,t and ρ w,z,t be the reduced densities on A π,t of σ z and ρ w,z , respectively. Dependently of Z, we denote the decoding POVM by {Y w,Z } w . Then, we define the states R Z := m−1 w=0 (1/m)|w w| ⊗ ρ w,Z and S Z := m−1 w=0 (1/m)|w w|⊗σ Z,t ⊗I/d t c , and the operator Y Z := m−1 w=0 |w w|⊗Y w,Z . Considering the information processing inequality for the two-valued measurement {Y Z , I − Y Z }, we have
where P err,k (Ψ (m)
The equation (a) can be shown as follows.
The inequality (b) can be shown as follows. Assume that ρ w,Z = i p i |φ i φ i |. Then,
where ρ i is the reduced density of |φ i φ i | on A π,t . Combining (68), (72), and Lemma V.2, we have
Now, we choose a sequence of QPIR protocols {Ψ . Let d t,ℓ and d t c ,ℓ be the dimensions of A π,t and A π,t c for the protocol Ψ (mℓ) QPIR , respectively. Then, for sufficiently large ℓ, we have
which implies (46).
VI. CONCLUSION
We have discussed the t-private quantum private information retrieval, where the identity of the target file is secret to the colluding t servers. We defined two secrecy parameters, the user t-secrecy and the server secrecy. The user t-secrecy is the secrecy that any collection of t queries contains no information of the user's request, and the server secrecy is the secrecy that the user obtains no information of the other files than the target file. We derived two capacities of the t-private QPIR, the exact and asymptotic security-constrained capacities. When the number t of colluding servers is less than or equal to a half of the number n of servers, the capacities are exactly 1 whether considering the security conditions or not, and if t > n/2, the capacities are 2(n − t)/n. For the proof of the capacity, we constructed a t-private QPIR protocol with perfect security conditions by the stabilizer formalism. The converse bounds are also derived, which complete the optimality of our protocol. One open problem is the t-private QPIR capacity for t ≥ n/2 when the server secrecy is not asymptotically negligible to the file size. It is also unknown the QPIR capacity without shared entanglement among servers.
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APPENDIX A QUANTUM INFORMATION MEASURES
In this section, we define quantum information measures used in this paper. For a state ρ, von Neumann entropy is defined by H(ρ) := −ρ log ρ. Let AB := A ⊗ B. For a state ρ on A ⊗ B ⊗ C and X ∈ {A, B, C, AB, BC, CA, ABC}, let ρ X be the reduced state on X and H(X ) ρ := H(ρ X ). The conditional entropy, mutual information, and conditional information are defined by
Let X be a random variablew with probability distribution p X . When a state ρ X on A depends on X, we define the joint stateρ X := x p X=x |x x| ⊗ ρ X , and denote H(X, A) ρX := H(X, A)ρ X . Other information quantities are also denoted by H(·|·) ρX := H(·|·)ρ X , I(·; ·) ρX := I(·; ·)ρ X , I(·; ·|·) ρX := I(·; ·|·)ρ X . 
By information processing inequality with respect to the POVM
and the state σ(m c , k) := q (1/m) · p Q=q|K=k |m k , q m k , q| ⊗ ρ qm for m = (m k , m c ), we obtain
is monotone decreasing, Eqs. (84) and (86) imply (47), i.e.,
By a similar method, we show (48), i.e.,
Define the average error probabilityp(k)
By information processing inequality with respect to the POVM defined in (85) 
The relation (49) is proved as follows:
where the equality (92) holds because Q is independent of M c k . The relation (50) is proved as follows. For any π ∈ S n and any k ∈ {1, . . . , f},
where the inequality (a) follows from Pinsker inequality. Thus, for any i, k ∈ {1, . . . , f}, we have 2fγ ≥ d(p Qπ,t|K=k , p Qπ,t ) + d(p Qπ,t , p Qπ,t|K=i ) ≥ d(p Qπ,t|K=k , p Qπ,t|K=i ),
which implies (63).
APPENDIX C PROOFS OF (44) AND (45)
In the following proofs, we use the notations given in Section V. That is, given K = k and a permutation π ∈ S n , we denote A π,t := t s=1 A π(s) , A π,t c := n s=t+1 A π(s) , d t := dim A π,t = d t , d t c := dim A π,t c = d (n−t) , P err,k (Ψ (m) QPIR ) := Pr W,Mk [W = M k |K = k]. The state ρ w,z is the state on A = A π,t ⊗ A π,t c after server encoding, where w is the target file, i.e., the k-th file, and z := (m c , q) for the collection m c of all files except for w and the collection q of queries, the state ρ w,z,t is the reduced state on A π,t of ρ w,z . Define the state σ z := (1/m)· m−1 w=0 ρ w,z and the operator Y z := m−1 w=0 |w w| ⊗ Y w,z . Eq. (44) is proved as follows. Fix K = k. Applying [30, (4.66) ] with σ Z and Y Z , we have QPIR ) = 0. We consider the case K = k and an arbitrary π ∈ S n is fixed. Since Lemma V.2 guarantees that the reduced density ρ w,z,t on A π,t does not depend on w, we denote it by ρ z,t . Applying [30, (4.66) ] with ρ Z,t ⊗ (I/d t c ) and Y Z , we have 
where (98) is obtained by applying the inequality φ(−r|ρ σ) := log Tr ρ 1+r σ −r ≥ φ(−r|κ(ρ) κ(σ)) for states ρ, σ, TP-CP map κ, and r ∈ (0, 1) [30, (5. 53)] to the choice ρ := x p x |x x| ⊗ |ψ w,z,x ψ w,z,x |, σ := x p x |x x| ⊗ (ρ z,x,t ⊗ I/d t c ) on the composite system X ⊗ A, and κ := Tr X . The last inequality (b) is shown as follows. Since ρ z,x,t is a reduced state of the pure state |ψ w,z,x in A π,t ⊗ A π,t c , we have rank ρ z,x,t ≤ min{dim A π,t c , dim A π,t c } = d t c , which implies Tr ρ 1−r z,x,t ≤ d r t c . Combining (97) and (99), we have
(1 − P err,k (Ψ (m) QPIR )) 1+r m r ≤ d 2r t c = d 2(n−t)r .
For any sequence of QPIR protocols {Ψ (mℓ)
QPIR has the QPIR rate greater than 2(n − t)/n for any sufficiently large ℓ, then (D(Ψ (mℓ) QPIR )) 2(n−t)/n /m ℓ = d 2(n−t) /m goes to 0. Therefore, from (100), the probability 1 − P err,k (Ψ (mℓ) QPIR ) approaches to 0, which implies (45).
